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THE “INVISIBLE” LOCAL COMMUNITIES: FOREIGN INVESTOR OBLIGATIONS, 
INCLUSIVENESS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 
 
Nicolás M. Perrone* 
 
International investment law is relational. It is about how we define and govern the 
relationship between the actors involved in and affected by foreign investment projects. 
Most international investment law literature confirms the relational nature of this field. 
The scholarship has analyzed the resolution of specific disputes and the regulatory 
relationship between foreign investors and host states. As could be expected, some of the 
key issues that have emerged include states’ right to regulate, the risk of regulatory chill, 
and how to review state regulation. There is, however, an important blind spot in this 
relational approach. A look at many foreign investment disputes, particularly in the 
natural resource extraction sector, shows that local communities are also central 
protagonists of foreign investment projects. These communities have a lot at stake but 
have remained almost invisible to the international investment regime. Apart from the 
ability to submit amicus curiae briefs, they have neither rights nor remedies in this 
regime.1 This essay discusses international investment law from an inclusive relational 
perspective, and shows how, contrary to this perspective, recent awards in investor-state 
dispute settlement continue to render invisible local communities and their rightful 
aspirations.  
 
A Relational Perspective on Foreign Investment 
 
Essentially, the international investment regime treats local communities as an 
absent actor. Foreign investment relations involve more than a foreign investor who 
wants to extract gold and a state that needs to decide whether this is environmentally 
acceptable. Very often, there is also a local community that has an interest in the same 
resources – often indigenous peoples.2 Locals may want to continue their current 
economic activities, such as agriculture or small-scale mining, and may have legal 
entitlements over the land. What the international investment regime does in a quiet – but 
effective– manner is to render invisible these local entitlements and community values.  
 
This contrasts with an inclusive, relational approach to foreign investment 
governance. This approach would highlight all the normative and distributive 
consequences of foreign investment projects (i.e., the multiplicity of rights and 
obligations at stake). In relational terms, foreign investor rights, states’ right to regulate, 
and local entitlements are often in tension. When investment tribunals are interpreting 
investment treaty standards of protection, they are also shaping and defining the public 
right to regulate. The literature examining the public law dimension of investment law 
underscores this. What has received much less attention is that the international 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of International Law, Durham Law School. 
1 Nicolás M. Perrone, The international investment regime and local populations: are the weakest voices 
unheard?, 7 TRANSNAT ’L LEGAL THEORY 383 (2016).  
2 See James Anaya, Extractive industries and indigenous peoples, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
rights of indigenous peoples to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/24/41 (2013). 
investment regime also affects obligations that foreign investors may have toward the 
local community. Making local communities invisible shifts costs and risks to these 
communities.  
 
Foreign Investor Obligations and Local Rights 
 
Foreign investors have different obligations to local communities. They have to 
comply with international human rights obligations and, importanlty, they also need to 
respect property and contractual obligations as defined in domestic and – increasingly but 
still limitedly – in international law. These property and contractual obligations can be 
divided into four categories. First, foreign investors must respect the property rights of 
those living near the project, including individual or communal rights in the case of 
indigenous land. Some of these obligations have been incorporated in international 
conventions and documents, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Convention 169 and the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Responsible Governance of Tenure. Second, if foreign investors own property, that 
may create obligations to the community, such as to let people pass through the property. 
Third, foreign investors may enter into specific transactions or make representations to 
local actors, such as in community benefit agreements, creating contractual or reliance 
obligations.3 These obligations are typically governed by domestic law and, in some 
instances, foreign investors are required to enter into these agreements. Finally, foreign 
investors arguably owe an obligation to the community as a whole to contribute to local 
values and prosperity.4 
 
 The scope and enforcement of these property and contractual obligations have 
been muddled by the internationalisation of foreign investor rights. Allowing foreign 
investors to enforce their rights internationally means that those locals whose rights are 
affected cannot bring these interests within the same legal process. The large majority of 
local entitlements – and correlative foreign investor obligations – are governed by 
domestic law. They are normally not recognized by international investment law and 
local actors, in any case, have no standing before investment tribunals (except for amicus 
curiae submissions). This result is problematic because investment tribunals may affect 
local community interests through the interpretation of foreign investor rights. Many 
foreign investment disputes involve the distribution and use of land.5 At best, in some 
instances, local communities can bring claims against their states before human rights 
tribunals, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the African Court of 
Human Rights, or the European Court of Human Rights. But this is rarely enough.  
 
An alternative could be to allow host states (or local communities) to enforce 
these foreign investor obligations in international investment tribunals. To be enforceable 
by an international investment tribunal, there would need to be a clear set of foreign 
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investor obligations in international law, which arbitrators would then interpret. The UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are a good example of this, which 
state that business enterprises should respect human rights. But this process would not be 
free from problems. First, rewriting property or contractual obligations in international 
human rights, environmental or corporate social responsibility language creates more 
fluid and less specific international law obligations. These obligations may promote 
universal goals but not specific community interests.6 Secondly, there currently is little 
clarity about whether it is the state or the investor who is responsible for upholding these 
human rights obligations. Thirdly, the scope of such norms remains particularly vague, 
creating fertile soil for different interpretative choices, as I now illustrate. All this casts 
doubt on whether an ad-hoc or permanent investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
mechanism – an expensive forum specialized in foreign investment protection – is the 
appropriate institutional choice for a more inclusive and relational approach to foreign 
investment disputes.7 
 
Enforcing Foreign Investor Obligations in Investment Tribunals 
 
The first obstacle to enforcing foreign investor obligations – and local community 
rights – in an investment tribunal is jurisdiction. Investment treaties do not provide local 
communities with access to ISDS or substantive rights. The communities can only submit 
amicus briefs. In the international investment regime, local communities are represented 
by the state and, as a result, locals depend on their respective governments to promote 
their interests.  
 
States can rarely sue foreign investors under international investment treaties, but 
they can rely on different strategies to enforce foreign investor obligations when sued. 
The first one is to bring a counterclaim. The wording of the applicable international 
investment treaty is critical to this strategy. Where arbitrators have accepted a 
counterclaim, including in Urbaser v. Argentina, the arbitration clauses have been 
broadly worded to allow the tribunal to decide “any dispute” between the parties related 
to the investment. Tribunals have been more restrictive, however, when the wording of 
the treaty refers to specific causes of action.8 Importantly, most new generation 
investment treaties do not grant jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning corporate 
social responsibility or other similarly worded clauses.  
 
An alternative is to convince foreign investors to accept the jurisdiction of a 
tribunal to decide issues beyond the scope of the arbitration clause. This may seem 
unlikely; however, foreign investors may prefer to have an investment tribunal rather 
than a domestic court hear such a claim. This occurred in Burlington v. Ecuador, where 
Burlington initially stated that it would challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction over 
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Ecuador’s counterclaim for environmental degradation but later decided to accept it.9 
This approach allows the tribunal to decide both the rights and the obligations of the 
investor. The problem is that these decisions are made in an international arbitral forum 
specialized in foreign investment protection, conducted far away from the local 
community. 
 
Alternatively, a state can rely on foreign investor obligations as a defense to either 
bar the investor’s claim or reduce the compensation the state pays. This strategy has been 
useful for states when they can prove that the investor engaged in corrupt acts or violated 
host state laws. Investment tribunals have treated corruption strictly, dismissing a claim if 
there is evidence of bribery. In World Duty Free v. Kenya, the tribunal rejected the claim, 
noting that the prohibition of corruption is a matter of transnational public policy.10 Other 
tribunals have dismissed claims based on serious violations of domestic law during the 
establishment of the project.11 Defenses based on less serious violations of domestic law 
have led tribunals to reduce the compensation states must pay to investors. Tribunals 
have accepted contributory fault when foreign investors fail to comply with domestic law 
(MTD v. Chile) or act in breach of domestic regulations, but where the state’s sanction 
was disproportionate (Occidental v. Ecuador 2).12 
 
The Lessons of Copper Mesa, Bear Creek and Urbaser 
 
Recently, the tribunal in Copper Mesa v. Ecuador had the opportunity to examine 
the behavior of the foreign investor towards the local community, and to decide whether 
this behavior could serve as a basis to either reject the claim or reduce the compensation 
owed by the state.13 The local community strongly opposed the project from the start. In 
analyzing the dispute, the tribunal acknowledged the “reckless escalation of violence 
which [the investor] (by itself and by its contractors and subcontractors) had introduced 
into the Junín area.”14 In the arbitrators’ view, Copper Mesa “had acquired, irrevocably, a 
malign reputation for intimidation, threats, deception, mendacity and violence amongst 
members of the local communities.”15  
 
The government eventually terminated the concessions, and Copper Mesa filed an 
arbitration claim demanding compensation for a violation of the Canada-Ecuador 
investment treaty. Ecuador asked the tribunal to find that it had no jurisdiction and that 
the claim was inadmissible as a consequence of the investor’s illegal behavior. The 
tribunal did not accept this argument; it concluded that Ecuador was aware of Copper 
Mesa’s behavior and did not act in a timely way, and that Ecuador could have done more 
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to help the foreign investor carry out the project.16 Barring the claim was, for the tribunal, 
a “stark and potentially harsh” result.17 The tribunal “preferred” to base the decision on 
the investor’s negligence, rather than to conclude that Copper Mesa’s actions had been 
willfully driven by the senior management in Canada.18 The arbitrators decided that 
Ecuador had expropriated the concessions and violated the fair and equitable standard of 
treatment under the treaty. Yet they also accepted that the foreign investor had 
contributed to the unviability of the project and therefore reduced the compensation by 
30%. 
 
The reasoning in Copper Mesa shows how arbitrators take into account foreign 
investor behavior towards local communities. It is difficult to imagine a case in which the 
foreign investor could have acted less responsibly. The tribunal, however, only granted a 
mere 30% discount.19 This discount is not high compared to the 50% discount of MTD v. 
Chile, where the foreign investor did not take Chilean law into account when planning 
the investment. Moreover, the importance given to the state’s awareness of the situation 
highlights the obstacles confronting those who seek to enforce foreign investor 
obligations towards local communities. Sometimes, as in this case, states overlook or 
promote actions that may affect local community interests. For the Copper Mesa tribunal, 
crucially, this attitude reduced the foreign investor’s responsibility for its misconduct. 
The outcome of this approach is that even when foreign investor actions lead to social 
unrest, the investors are rarely held responsible and might even receive some 
compensation if the project is later cancelled. 
 
The case of Bear Creek v. Peru is similar in this respect. Bear Creek successfully 
challenged the existence of an international law obligation towards the local community, 
relying on domestic law, which is normally understood to be the less favorable law to 
foreign investors.20 This project also found great local opposition but enjoyed support 
from the Peruvian government, which lasted until the protests turned violent and an 
emergency cabinet meeting cancelled the exploration license. The tribunal found that 
Peru had expropriated the right to seek a permit to mine and violated the investor’s due 
process rights by failing to invite the foreign investor to participate in a key meeting. The 
arbitrators acknowledged that the community did not trust Bear Creek.21 According to the 
tribunal, however, the Peruvian government not only approved the outreach program in 
accordance with domestic law but also knew of the community’s discontent. As a result, 
the arbitrators found that the foreign investor had no further responsibility in this 
regard.22  
 
The dissenting arbitrator disagreed. Relying on Urbaser v. Argentina, he 
considered that the ILO Convention 169, which requires states to obtain the free, prior, 
informed and consent (FPIC) of indigenous peoples, also imposes an obligation to 
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foreign investors not to engage in actions that can affect human rights.23 Crucially, he 
highlighted that under international law both foreign investors and local communities 
have rights.24 The majority rejected this position, however, noting that the ILO 
Convention 169 only imposes an obligation on states, and that the local community is not 
a party to the investment arbitration.25 
 
Aside from this arbitral interpretation, the human rights-based protection of local 
community interests has other shortcomings. The celebrated award in Urbaser v. 
Argentina granted jurisdiction to hear Argentina’s counterclaim, as the arbitrators 
accepted that foreign investors have an obligation “not to engage in activity aimed at 
destroying [human] rights.”26 The issue, however, is that states have the primary duty to 
protect human rights from abuse by third parties, and it is difficult to define the scope of 
the duties of foreign investors. This weakens this approach considerably. For one, it is 
unlikely that foreign investors will violate human rights openly and deliberately. The 
Copper Mesa v. Ecuador is a serious case of misconduct – which included criminal 
activity – and the arbitrators only granted a 30% discount. For another, most foreign 
investors only invest after securing sufficient state support, support that can be later used 
to show state inconsistency, awareness of misconduct, and the need to protect the 
investor despite its obligations (as occurred in Copper Mesa and Bear Creek).27  
 
If states have the responsibility to pursue the enforcement of foreign investor 
human rights-based obligations, moreover, this approach to protect local interests would 
create problems similar to those found in diplomatic protection. Local communities 
would have no means to ensure that states protect their interests or that they transfer any 
compensation back to the community. This is why most legal systems operate under a 
different structure. Those who are involved in a legal relationship have rights and 
obligations that they can enforce directly.  
 
But many investment tribunals, including Urbaser v. Argentina, limit this 
relational approach. That award opened up the possibility of limited human rights-based 
counterclaims while it closed down the protection of property and contractual local 
community rights. The arbitrators decided that foreign investor contractual obligations 
were outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The tribunal noted that: 
 
[…] while Respondent correctly introduces the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
as a principle of international law, it identifies the relevant pactum as Claimants’ 
obligation to invest in expansion work, thus relying again on the Concession 
Contract and admitting that international law does not provide a cause of action 
for the Counterclaim.28 
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This conclusion exacerbates the inherent asymmetry of international investment 
law: the internationalisation of foreign investor rights without internationalizing the 
corresponding property and contractual obligations of foreign investors. It also 
undermines creative contractual solutions to promote local community interests.29 It is 
true that international investment law does not prevent states from regulating to protect 
local community interests or hinder local courts from finding foreign investors 
responsible for damages. But there are limitations to this because states need to create a 
good investment climate, attract foreign investors and, ultimately, face financial 
constraints to compensate foreign investors, as where they were aware of the foreign 
investor’s misconduct.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Foreign investment’s contribution to sustainable development depends on foreign 
investor obligations, among other things. A legal regime in which adjudicators have 
broad jurisdiction to decide on state measures that may affect foreign investor property 
and contractual rights but very limited scope to examine foreign investor correlative 
obligations contradicts the complex and relational character of the investment process. 
ISDS, however, may not be the right forum in which to decide on both foreign investor 
rights and obligations. The challenge is to find (or create) the appropriate institutional 
mechanism. 
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